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APPLYING NEPA TO JOINT FEDERAL AND NON-
FEDERAL PROJECTS 
By Elizabeth A.E. Brown* 
INTRODUCTION 
A major loophole has developed in the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) 1 which essentially allows private or state pro-
jects receiving federal funds to avoid the requirements of the Act. 
Either by arranging for environmentally damaging aspects of the 
project to occur before the federal funding agency becomes fully 
involved, or by taking early action which forecloses less environmen-
tally damaging alternatives, project sponsors can defeat clearly 
enunciated national environmental policies. Because NEPA applies 
only to "federal action", 2 courts have held that they lack jurisdic-
tion to enforce the Act's requirements against non-federal parties 
even though the project may later be "federalized" through the 
receipt of federal aid. 3 
This loophole could be narrowed by judicial adoption of standards 
which would allow courts to recognize "federal action" at an earlier 
stage in the relationship between the federal and non-federal project 
participants. Alternatively, the loophole could be eliminated ad-
ministratively by federal agencies adopting status quo regulations 
which specify what preparatory work can and cannot be done if a 
project sponsor wishes to remain eligible for federal funds. This 
article will discuss both judicial and administrative steps which 
should be taken to ensure NEPA's effectiveness with respect to 
projects initiated by non-federal parties but subject to later "feder-
alization" through the receipt of federal funding. 4 Since issues in 
this area are generally presented to the courts by plaintiffs seeking 
injunctive relief under NEPA against non-federal parties, special 
attention will be paid to the problems faced by such plaintiffs. 
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
A wide array of environmentally significant activities entail the 
135 
136 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
cooperative effort of federal and non-federal participants. The fed-
eral contribution to such joint ventures may consist of planning, 
physical construction, merely passive funding, or licensing of ac-
tions taken by a non-federal party. Characteristically, in the era of 
"new federalism", the federal government has borne a percentage 
of the bill for projects, such as highway construction, which are 
conceived and executed by agencies of state government. Projects 
of this sort normally must satisfy a multitude of federal criteria in 
order to be eligible for federal financial assistance. Additionally, 
federal agencies administering grant-in-aid programs must comply 
with certain procedural requirements applicable to federal agency 
decisionmaking. 
The National Environmental Policy Act has generated numerous 
procedural requirements for federal agency decisionmaking with 
regard to joint federal and non-federal projects. The most conse-
quential ofthese procedural requirements is imposed by §102(2)(C), 
which mandates preparation and consideration of an environmental 
impact statement (EIS) in connection with every "major federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."5 NEPA's requirements are intended to ensure a careful and 
informed consideration of environmental values by federal agency 
decisionmakers, with the result that environmentally optimal deci-
sions are made in light of other relevant social and economic consid-
erations. NEP A does not explicitly require federal agencies to re-
frain from damaging the environment, but only that they weigh 
environmental factors with other considerations and consider pro-
ject alternatives which would have a less harmful impact on the 
environment.8 
For an environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to 
§102(2)(C) of NEPA to serve its intended purpose as an aid in the 
federal decisionmaking process, it is essential that it be prepared as 
early as possible in the planning stages of a project.7 The Council 
on Environmental Quality's Guidelines for Preparation of Environ-
mental Impact Statements stress at several points the importance 
of preparation "as early as possible and in all cases prior to agency 
decision."8 Of course, it would be a waste of agency resources if 
impact statements were prepared for every vague and remote pro-
ject suggestion. But once a proposed project has taken on some 
discernible form and is likely to be given serious consideration, an 
environmental impact statement must be prepared "concurrently 
with initial technical and economic studies."9 If the impact state-
ment is prepared late in the decisionmaking process a dangerous 
NEPA AND JOINT PROJECTS 137 
tendency will exist to make it merely a written justification for 
decisions previously made, rather than a tool for exploring alterna-
tives and choosing the most beneficial course of action. 
By the terms of NEPA §102(2)(C), environmental impact state-
ments need be prepared only when "federal" action is involved in a 
project. In keeping with the strength of NEPA's policy declarations 
and the Congressional mandate to implement these policies "to the 
fullest extent possible," courts have adopted a liberal interpretation 
of "federal action" .10 For instance, impact statements have been 
required for projects needing only permits or approvals from federal 
regulatory agencies, II for private developments with mortgage guar-
antees from the Department of Housing and Urban Development,12 
and for state projects utilizing funds from "no strings" block grants 
from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) .13 In 
the absence of a state Environmental Policy Act, however, state and 
private developers are not presently required by law to take into 
account the possible negative environmental impacts of their pro-
jects. 
Notably, federal involvement in joint efforts generally consists 
only of ongoing federal review and planning assistance until quite 
late in the overall planning process when ex post facto ratification 
of non-federal action takes place, and federal funding is made avail-
able. In broad outline, the funding process consists of a preliminary 
period in which the state government or private developer con-
ceives, plans, and lays the foundation for execution of a given pro-
ject with the help of federal planning assistance, followed by a pe-
riod of comprehensive federal review and approval of the project for 
federal funds. Owing to the relatively minor significance of the fed-
eral role in the early stages of joint activities, it is sometimes exceed-
ingly difficult for the judiciary to determine the proper relationship 
of federal environmental requirements under NEPA to state activity 
in the preliminary period. 
In deciding when a state or privately sponsored project which is 
to receive federal assistance becomes "federal", courts have at-
tempted to determine the point at which the federal government 
joins "in partnership" with the non-federal sponsor. 14 It is reasoned 
that, until this so-called partnership stage is reached, there is no 
federal action and, consequently, courts have no jurisdiction under 
NEPA to enjoin the non-federal party, regardless of whether it is 
engaging in environmentally destructive activity or other activity 
which will effectively preclude later consideration of environmen-
tally preferable project alternatives. This question of timing, then, 
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becomes one of major importance. If all environmentally damaging 
aspects of a project are completed or alternatives foreclosed before 
the sponsor joins "in partnership" with a federal agency to complete 
the project, NEPA's requirements can be effectively avoided. 
Judicial response to these questions has been largely tentative 
and far from satisfactory. A convincing argument can be made that, 
owing to the unenthusiastic response of federal agencies to NEPA's 
mandates, non-federal participants in joint activities have been al-
lowed to deliberately frustrate NEPA's purposes while remaining 
eligible for federal aid. In such situations, preparing an impact 
statement becomes a rather useless formality since it no longer 
serves as an aid in an open decisionmaking process or encourages 
agencies to consider alternatives having less harmful environmental 
impacts. 
Nevertheless, courts have been slow in developing a definitive 
standard of review for determining when a project sponsor seeking 
federal financial aid becomes a partner of the federal government 
and, therefore, when the environmental impact statement must be 
prepared and considered. In order to more fully understand recent 
judicial opinions which emphasize the overall nexus between the 
federal agency and the non-federal project sponsor in deciding 
whether an action is yet federal, it is first necessary to trace two 
earlier developments: the highway cases which initially dealt with 
this problem and the "final decision" standard put forth in City of 
Boston v. Volpe 15 (hereinafter cited as City of Boston). 
ll. THE HIGHWAY CASES 
Since the Federal-Aid Highway Program is the nation's largest 
continuing public works program,18 it is not surprising that highway 
cases were the first to deal with the issue of when an applicant for 
federal funds triggers NEPA requirements. For the most part, the 
highway cases recognized the need for early preparation of impact 
statements and, therefore, the need for early "federalization" of 
state highway projects in order to carry out both the letter and spirit 
of NEPA. However, in doing so they have not established standards 
which give much guidance when applied to other federal funding 
situations. 
Often, courts would simply state that it was necessary to find 
federal action in a particular highway project which was a potential 
federal-aid recipient in order to make the Congressional directive 
found in NEPA meaningful. This rationale is evidenced most clearly 
in La Raza Unida v. Volpe,17 (hereinafter cited as La Raza) and 
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Sierra Club v. Volpe,18 a case decided a few months after La Raza: 
The rationale of La Raza Unida is that Congressional policy statements 
in federal environmental and similar statutes, together with the legisla-
tive history of these enactments, indicate a great concern of Congress 
with problems of environmental protection, particularly in the area of 
highway construction; that common sense suggests that all the protec-
tion which the Congress has sought to provide would be futile gestures 
were the states and federal agencies allowed to ignore federal statutes 
and regulations until deleterious effects upon the environment have 
actually occurred while the option for receiving federal funds still re-
mains open. 19 
Another common reason for finding state highway projects sub-
ject to NEPA was the voluntary involvement of the states with 
federal funding and federal participation. As expressed in Named 
Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Society v. 
Texas Highway Dept., the state enters into a relationship with the 
federal government with its "eyes open having more than adequate 
warning of the controversial nature of the project and the applicable 
law."20 
In Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe,21 (hereinafter cited as Indian 
Lookout) the issue of whether a state highway program had become 
subject to NEPA was again presented. While primarily stressing the 
voluntary nature of the state's involvement with the federal agency, 
the court also reviewed the steps involved in the highway funding 
process itself. Under the federal-aid highway program, state high-
way departments are responsible for planning, designing and con-
structing the federal-aid highways, while the federal government 
reimburses the states for a portion of the costs. The Federal High-
way Administration is responsible for assuring that federal stan-
dards are adhered to before states are reimbursed. This responsibil-
ity is carried out by requiring the state highway departments to 
obtain federal approvals at various stages in the highway building 
process.22 Administrative regulations and guidelines call for location 
approval,23 design approva124 and an authorization to begin work. 25 
Two other federal approvals are mandated by statute: program ap-
prova126 and plans, specifications and estimates approva1. 27 
No case has yet decided exactly what is the earliest point in this 
funding process at which a state highway plan becomes a major 
federal action. Before Indian Lookout, cases had held that highways 
which had received location approval from the F.ederal Highway 
Administration could be enjoined until an environmental impact 
statement was prepared.28 The court in Indian Lookout reached fur-
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ther back in time and held that the requirements of NEPA applied 
when the state highway department first sought location approval. 29 
In coming to this conclusion, however, the court applied no stan-
dard which can readily be used in situations outside the highway 
funding context to determine when a particular state or private 
project becomes "federalized". While noting generally that the 
state's voluntary involvement in the funding process and the CEQ 
guidelines call for early preparation of impact statements, the court 
also recognized that it would be impractical to require expenditures 
of considerable time and money on impact statements for indefinite 
or tentative proposals.30 No reason was given, however, for coming 
down on one side of the line rather than the other. 
Curiously, the court cited City of Boston v. Volpe, decided a year 
earlier, as precedent,31 but refrained from applying the standard 
developed therein. If it had applied the City of Boston standard to 
the highway-aid funding process, the result would have been differ-
ent because the state's initial actions to establish eligibility for fed-
eral aid would not have been sufficient by themselves to "federal-
ize" the project. 
III. CITY OF BOSTON AND THE "FINAL DECISION" TEST 
Until recently the major case setting out a definite standard of 
review to be applied in determining when the federal government 
becomes a partner in an otherwise local project was City of Boston 
v. Volpe. 32 In City of Boston, the city was seeking a preliminary 
injunction against the Massachusetts Port Authority (an autono-
mous, special purpose public entity) to restrain it from expanding 
facilities at Logan Airport which would inevitably result in in-
creased air traffic over Boston. The city contended that the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) had violated NEPA by failing to 
issue an environmental impact statement in connection with the 
processing of the Port Authority's request for a federal airport devel-
opment grant, and therefore the Port Authority should be restrained 
from beginning work on the project until an impact statement was 
filed and considered. The court, however, held that the process of 
obtaining federal funding had not progressed to the point where the 
project had become "federal". Thus there was no jurisdiction under 
NEPA to enjoin the non-federal party even though construction was 
already taking place. The test used was whether the funding process 
had reached a stage where the federal agency had made a "final 
decision" . 33 
The essence of the court's standard of review hinges on the inter-
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pretation of the words "final decision". Was the court looking for 
the point in the funding process when the federal agency had made 
a legally binding agreement to fund the project? Or did "final deci-
sion" mean acceptance of a broad outline of the project proposal, 
which would then be seriously considered for federal funding? If the 
court intended "final decision" to indicate a legally binding con-
tract, it cut the heart out of NEPA as applied to federally funded 
projects. The Act clearly intends that the environmental impact be 
considered in making the "final decision" to go ahead with a partic-
ular project, and yet this approach would render a court unable to 
enforce NEPA's requirements until after there had been a legally 
binding decision. 
As with most federal funding procedures, the process of obtaining 
an Airport Development Aid grant is extremely complicated. The 
court in City of Boston found that, at the time the case was before 
it, the funding process had progressed to a point where: 
a state authority, fully empowered to raise and spend funds for airports, 
has "requested" a federal grant, 14 C.F.R. §151.21(a), the federal 
agency has made a· "tentative allocation" of funds for the project, 14 
C.F.R. §151.21(b), and the authority has then submitted a formal appli-
cation, 14 C.F.R. §151.21(c).a4 
In applying its test, the court found that the tentative allocation 
was not binding on the FAA but represented only "an administra-
tive device for budgetary and program planning."35 Thus there had 
been a general approval of the project, but no binding contract to 
fund it. The court apparently held that since no final commitment 
of federal funds had been made, the FAA had not as yet become a 
partner in the airport expansion project. The practical effect of the 
court's test was that, although the defendant's actions were "far 
from that ordained by the letter and spirit of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act,"36 the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
enjoin airport construction by the non-federal party.37 
The ultimate effect of a general application of the final decision 
test would be to exempt federally funded projects from NEPA re-
quirements.38 Courts would lack jurisdiction to enforce NEPA before 
a final decision was made. By the time that decision was made by 
the federal agency, less environmentally damaging project alterna-
tives would have been foreclosed by the action of the non-federal 
party. Although a court might then find a procedural violation of 
NEPA, no effective remedy would be possible, since it would be too 
late to duplicate the kind of staged infusion of environmental infor-
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mation and consideration into the decisionmaking process that 
NEPA contemplates. 3u 
In applying the final decision test, the court in City of Boston was 
hard-pressed to distinguish cases interpreting NEPA in the context 
of federal aid for highway construction. It did so by pointing to the 
difference in the funding process for highways: 
In all of the cases in which a court found a highway to be federal, the 
federal government had at least granted location approval. And while 
location approval does not carry with it a commitment of funds, it is a 
decision, in the ordinary course final, that a federal aid highway is 
approved for a particular location and that the focus for the next set of 
hearings and review will be not the same question but the more specific 
one whether a particular design meets the relevant standards. In con-
trast, the airport aid scheme contemplates, so far as the statute is con-
cerned, a single decision to fund or not fund a project. . . The salient 
feature of a tentative allocation of airport aid, as opposed to highway 
location approval, is that while the whole of a proposed airport project 
thereby receives a generally favorable reaction, the whole is in the ordi-
nary sense given closer scrutiny before final decision.40 
The Indian Lookout highway case, which was decided after City 
of Boston, did find federal action before location approval was re-
ceived from the federal agency. Assuming that the City of Boston 
court would have simply dismissed Indian Lookout as wrongly de-
cided, there are still many difficulties with its distinction between 
airport and highway funding. 
The court's distinction seems to be applying one meaning of 
"final decision" to the highway funding process and another in the 
case of airport aid. In the case of highway aid the court finds loca-
tion approval to be a final decision as to the outline of the particular 
project. However, when the court looks at airport aid, it finds tenta-
tive allocation not to be a final, legally binding decision to commit 
federal funds, although it clearly is a general approval of the pro-
ject's substance. Actually, neither location approval for highways 
nor tentative allocation of airport aid are final decisions by federal 
agencies to grant funds to a particular project. The question should 
be whether tentative allocation of airport aid involves a final federal 
decision with regard to an environmentally significant aspect of the 
airport project, such as its location or general outline. The fact that 
most airport grant agreements are executed within a matter of 
weeks after "tentative" allocation, and some within a few days,41 
strongly suggests that such allocation may be more "final" than the 
court believed. 
NEPA AND JOINT PROJECTS 143 
In rejecting the applicability of the highway cases, the court in 
City of Boston not only used different yardsticks in comparing the 
funding processes, but also ignored the reasons given by various 
courts in the highway cases, which, for the most part, focused on 
policy and equitable considerations rather than on the nature of the 
funding process. A state's voluntary involvement in the funding 
process and the need for early application ofNEPA's procedures are 
considerations which would appear to be equally relevant in con-
texts other than highway projects. Indeed, even the First Circuit 
itself, in Silva v. Romney42 (hereinafter cited as Silva), expressed 
doubt as to the validity of the distinction it had drawn between the 
highway and airport funding procedures in City of Boston, and evi-
denced a new approach for finding "federalization" of projects 
which are potential recipients of federal aid. 
IV. SILVA V. ROMNEY AND THE NEXUS TEST 
The same court which set forth the final decision test in City of 
Boston, subsequently backed off from a mechanical application of 
the test in Silva v. Romney. 43 In Silva, the First Circuit shifted the 
object of its inquiry from a particular stage in the funding process 
to the overall "nexus" between the federal agency and the project 
sponsor. The case involved a housing project undertaken by a pri-
vate developer who was seeking a mortgage guarantee and interest 
grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD). The District Court was willing to enjoin HUD from giving 
any assistance until an environmental impact statement had been 
prepared. However, when the developer began to cut trees at the 
project site, the court refused to enjoin the private developer from 
taking interim action affecting the environment. The court based 
this decision on the ground that it lacked power to enjoin a private 
party from using his land as he pleases merely because an applica-
tion for federal aid had been filed. However, Chief Circuit Judge 
Coffin found that the project had reached the "partnership" stage 
between HUD and the developer. Therefore, the developer could be 
restrained from taking any further action until the impact state-
ment had been issued. The court made this determination after 
noting that HUD had already approved the mortgage guarantee and 
interest grant, and that although final closing had not yet taken 
place, HUD had made a "180 day commitment." 
This result would have followed had the court simply applied the 
test it had set forth in City of Boston (i.e., whether the funding 
process had reached a stage where the federal agency had made a 
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final decision to fund the project). The court, however, chose in-
stead to speak of the overall nexus between HUD and the developer 
being so extensive as to constitute "partnership". 
While this case, as we have noted, is not controlled by City of Boston, 
we confess to a sense of growing uneasiness in seeing decisions determin-
ing the obligations of federal and non-federal parties under NEPA turn 
on anyone interim step in the development of the partnership between 
the parties. Such an approach unrealistically stresses adventitious fac-
tors which bear little relationship to either the broad concerns of NEPA 
or the interests of the potential grantee, private or public. Hence, in the 
present case, the mere fact that a binding contract has been entered into 
between Hun and the developer is but one manifestation of and quite 
irrelevant to an ongoing planning process by all parties to the project 
which must provide for the reasonable expectations of the parties.44 
The nexus test is less rigid than the narrow funding standard 
because it recognizes that federal participation involves more than 
just the granting of funds. It would include all considerations rele-
vant to the "ongoing planning process." For example, has the fed-
eral agency been involved with planning and regulation of past and 
future aspects of a project? Also entering into the court's analysis 
would be the "reasonable expectations of the parties." Even ifthere 
is not yet a binding contract, are the circumstances such that the 
non-federal party reasonably expects that federal aid will ultimately 
be forthcoming? Because of the many possible relevant considera-
tions, however, the nexus test is also a good deal less precise, and 
requires a case-by-case factual determination of the extent of the 
relationship between the federal agency and the non-federal project 
sponsor.45 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was quick to adopt the 
nexus test. Proetta v. Dent48 concerned the denial of a preliminary 
injunction against eviction and demolition by New York City on a 
site where a private company had planned plant expansion to be 
financed by a federal loan. No federal funds were to be received by 
the city for the demolition work. It had become involved in the 
project only for the purpose of helping to prevent private industry 
from leaving the city. The question was whether the city was subject 
to an injunction pending fulfillment of NEP A requirements, even 
though the city itself would not directly be receiving federal funds. 
The court found that no partnership relationship existed between 
the city and the federal government. "While not deciding whether 
a non-recipient of a loan may ever be in partnership with the federal 
government, upon the facts in this case we find that the nexus 
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between the City and EDA [The Economic Development Adminis-
tration of the Commerce Department] is insufficiently proximate 
to warrant restraint of the former for lack of statutory compliance 
by the latter."47 
Other courts will most likely utilize the nexus test as a good way 
of determining the necessary relationship between a federal agency 
and the potential recipient of federal funds sufficient to confer juris-
diction over the non-federal party under NEPA. Continuing litiga-
tion applying the standard to myriad federal administrative proce-
dures will undoubtedly lead to a clarification of the test. The First 
Circuit itself presently has an opportunity for further development 
of its new standard in City of Boston v. Brinegar,48 a case factually 
very similar to City of Boston v. Volpe. 
City of Boston v. Brinegar deals again with the expansion of 
Logan Airport,49 this time specifically with construction of a new 
General Aviation/Short Take Off and Landing runway and a run-
ways extension project. At the time the injunction restraining the 
Port Authority from construction of the runways was sought, the 
FAA had not made a tentative allocation offunds, although the Port 
Authority had filed a request for aid. The District Court felt con-
strained to follow City of Boston v. Volpe, although it clearly felt 
uncomfortable in doing so. It held that the project had not yet 
reached the federal partnership stage. "Consequently, even though 
the timing of actual construction in relation to the grant application 
may eventually result in effective, if not deliberate, frustration of 
the National Environmental Policy Act, the court has no present 
power to enjoin the construction of the runways project by the Au-
thority."50 
On appeal from this decision, the Circuit Court has an opportun-
ity to make clear that it no longer intends to apply a test based 
solely on the stage of the funding process, which in practice allows 
the agencies involved to effectively ignore environmental considera-
tions. In applying the nexus standard, the court will be able to take 
into consideration not only the procedures of the funding process, 
but also the District Court finding that: 
After the filing of the application, the representatives of the Authority 
consulted with officials of the FAA on every aspect of the runways pro-
ject to make sure that the runways project would qualify under ADAP 
[Airport Development Aid Program]. It is likely that all of the environ-
mentally significant decisions concerning the runways project will have 
been made, not only by the Authority but by the responsible FAA offi-
cials, before the final EIS [impact statement] is released.51 
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Such a finding, under the nexus test, should be determinative of the 
issue of project federalization. 
This hoped-for development of the nexus test would remove one 
major obstacle faced by plaintiffs seeking to enforce NEPA require-
ments. However, with the exception of highway projects funded 
through the Federal Highway Administration, where the quantity 
of litigation has resulted in a fairly clear understanding of what 
preparatory work may be done before issuance of the impact state-
ment, plaintiffs still have a major task ahead of them in convincing 
courts to move forward in developing a clear standard of review. 
Courts often appear innately conservative in deciding jurisdictional 
questions such as their ability to enjoin non-federal parties under a 
statute which, on its face, applies only to federal agencies. In addi-
tion, they are understandably concerned that by interfering in 
agency procedures, they may require impact statements to be pre-
pared for projects which ultimately do not receive federal funds, 
thereby wasting agency resources. Thus, when agencies assert that 
they are not committed to fund a project and may, in fact, decide 
not to fund it, courts are naturally hesitant to require preparation 
of an environmental impact statement. Plaintiffs may now meet the 
difficult challenge of overcoming these tendencies by clearly show-
ing that a close relationship between the federal agency and non-
federal party exists and that the parties "reasonably expect" that 
the project will eventually receive federal funds. 
V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN SEEKING JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS 
Plaintiffs must realize that there are alternative routes by which 
to force early consideration of environmental factors other than that 
of establishing a sufficiently proximate nexus between federal and 
non-federal parties with regard to a particular project. For instance, 
many states today have their own Environmental Policy Acts, 
which impose obligations akin to those of NEPA on state agencies 
and many private developers.52 In addition, where the non-federal 
party receives continuing federal support and supervision on a wide 
range of matters, a current segmented project may be characterized 
as part of a long-range plan which requires federal approval at its 
inception. If an environmental impact statement was not prepared 
and considered at that early planning stage, a court's jurisdiction 
under NEP A over the segment at issue might be based on federal 
approval of the overall plan, of which the segment is an integral 
part.53 
Once plaintiffs are successful in convincing a court that it has 
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jurisdiction to enjoin a particular non-federal party until the federal 
funding agency has prepared an adequate environmental impact 
statement, the non-federal party may still attempt avoidance of the 
court order by dissolving the so-called partnership relationship be-
tween itself and the federal agency. Recent court decisions have 
restricted this possibility, however, to those cases in which the pro-
ject sponsor is willing to totally reject federal funding and return 
any funds already received.54 
In Ely u. Velde55 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals clearly set 
forth this principle. The state of Virginia had planned to build a 
correctional center with funds received from an LEAA block grant, 
a "no strings" grant allocated to eligible states solely on the basis 
of population.56 When the state encountered resistance to its se-
lected site based on both NEPA and the National Historic Preserva-
tion Act, the state tried to disentangle itself from the controversy 
by saying that it would not use federal funds to build the center, 
but would continue its plans using only state money. The state 
contended that it could thereby remove the "federal action" label 
from the project and no longer be subject to the federal require-
ments. However, the Court of Appeals held that even though the 
federal funds had come from a block grant, the state must return 
to the federal government that portion of the grant which it had 
planned to use for the correctional center, and not use it for an 
alternative noncontroversial project. Only then could the state free 
the project from the requirements of NEP A. 
The numerous actions pressing for enforcement of NEP A in joint 
activity situations have the side effect of putting project sponsors 
on notice that if environmentally damaging work is begun before 
issuance of an impact statement, a court may find that a partner-
ship relationship with the federal agency exists and issue an injunc-
tion halting work in midstream. While courts do take into consider-
ation economic hardship that could result from enjoining a project 
after work has begun,57 Justice Douglas' recent opinion in Warm 
Springs Dam Task Force u. Gribble,58 (hereinafter cited as Warm 
Springs) confirms that courts will not hesitate to halt projects even 
after large sums of money have been expended if they feel that doing 
so is necessary to enforce NEPA. In Warm Springs Douglas halted 
construction work on a dam, even though $35 million had already 
been expended on the project, until the Court of Appeals could 
consider the adequacy of the contested impact statement. He spoke 
harshly of what he saw as the prevailing attitude towards imple-
mentation of NEPA: "The tendency has been to downgrade this 
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mandate of Congress, to use shortcuts to the desired end, to present 
impact statements after a project has been started and when there 
is already such momentum that it is difficult to stop."59 Sponsors 
of projects seeking federal funding should take cognizance of the 
possibility that if they start work before issuance of an adequate 
impact statement, they may be forced to come to an abrupt halt at 
a highly inconvenient point. 
VI. STATUS Quo REGULATIONS 
There is serious question whether the task of restraining project 
sponsors should be left solely to the judiciary. Even with a develop-
ing court standard which enables judicial recognition of federal ac-
tion at an earlier stage in projects seeking federal funding, the di-
lemma persists. Until federal action is found, courts can do nothing 
to prevent non-federal parties from doing irreparable harm to the 
environment and foreclosing less environmentally damaging project 
alternatives. In Silva, Judge Coffin called upon the federal funding 
agencies to address this problem by issuing status quo regulations 
as a guide to applicants for aid. 80 Such regulations would specify 
what preparatory work an applicant could begin before issuance of 
an adequate environmental impact statement without losing its eli-
gibility. 
Judge Coffin suggested possible standards for framing such status 
quo regulations. Specifically, it was noted that only preparatory 
work which is environmentally neutral or virtually so should be 
permitted before completion and review of an impact statement.81 
He also stated that the regulations would require a balancing of the 
freedom of the private party with the recognition that he has volun-
tarily submitted to some degree of federal regulation by applying for 
aid. The regulations could allow even environmentally damaging 
activities if the sponsor could meet a heavy burden of proof that the 
project would be completed with or without federal aid.82 
For example, the Atomic Energy Commission has adopted status 
quo regulations which prohibit "any clearing of land, excavation or 
other substantial action that would adversely affect the natural 
environment of a site ... " prior to the Commission's decision on 
applications for permits to construct nuclear facilities. 83 These regu-
lations were challenged in Gage v. Atomic Energy Commission84 
(hereinafter cited as Gage) as not being comprehensive enough be-
cause they permit acquisition of land at the proposed site before the 
environmental impact statement has been prepared, thereby pre-
cluding consideration of alternative sites for atomic energy plants. 
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However, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
avoided this issue by ruling that because the plaintiffs had chosen 
not to participate in the rulemaking process, although urged to do 
so by staff of the AEC, they could not later demand judicial review 
of the adequacy of the regulations. 
Since it is rare that such parties are specifically asked to take part 
in the rule making process, most plaintiffs would not encounter this 
barrier. However, the Gage decision points up the importance to 
plaintiffs of not waiting until some environmentally damaging ac-
tivity is imminent before seeking to protect the environment. When 
agencies are proposing regulations, environmentally concerned par-
ties should participate in the rulemaking proceedings. If agencies do 
not respond to the need for status quo regulations, consideration 
should then be given to initiating court action to require them to do 
so. 
Silva went further than politely suggesting that it would be help-
ful if agencies issued status quo regulations. That court strongly 
suggested that agencies could be required to issue such regulations: 
Apart from the practical advantages of regulations in the pre-
commitment stage, there would seem to be strong legal underpinnings, 
if not an actual mandate. Congress has "direct{edl that to the fullest 
extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the 
United States shall he interpreted and administered in accordance with 
the policies set forth in (NEPA)." 42 U.S.C. §4332(1) [court's empha-
sis]. We cannot think of any stronger language which could have been 
used to underscore the importance of protecting the environment. These 
duties are not discretionary, but are specifically mandated by Congress, 
and are to be reflected in the procedural process by which agencies 
render decisions. Moreover, the President has required that agencies 
review their "statutory authority, administrative regulations, policies, 
and procedures, including those relating to loans, grants, contracts, 
leases, licenses, or permits, in order to identify any deficiencies . . . 
which prohibit or limit full compliance with the purposes and provisions 
of (NEPA)." Executive Order 11514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (March 7, 1970) 
. . . The coexistence of this regulatory gap and the strength of the 
Congressional and Presidential directives might well justify a court in 
requiring an agency to formulate status quo regulations.85 
A mandate that agencies formulate status quo regulations is 
based not only upon the wording of NEPA and Executive Order 
11514, but also upon Guidelines of the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ). In response to the Silva decision, the new CEQ 
guidelines state: "For major categories of projects involving an ap-
plicant and identified. . . as normally requiring the preparation of 
150· ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
a statement, agencies should include in their procedures provisions 
limiting actions which an applicant is permitted to take prior to 
completion and review of the final statement with respect to his 
application. "66 
CEQ's specific instruction that agencies formulate status quo reg-
ulations should carry particular weight with a court faced with 
plaintiffs seeking a court order requiring an agency to do so. Justice 
Douglas' Warm Springs opinion stressed the importance of the 
CEQ, when he reversed a District Court because "[T]he Council 
on Environmental Quality, ultimately responsible for administra-
tion of the NEPA and most familiar with its requirements for Envi-
ronmental Impact Statements, has taken the unequivocal position 
that the statement in this case is deficient, despite the contrary 
conclusions of the District Court. "67 
The CEQ Guidelines are especially useful in overcoming the tend-
ency of courts not to interfere with administrative procedures, par-
ticularly administrative decisions not to issue regulations.68 In de-
ciding whether to require promulgation of status quo regulation, 
courts will be faced with contrary administrative positions: CEQ's 
directive that status quo regulations be promulgated and defendant 
agency's refusal to do so. Given the relative importance of CEQ's 
interpretation of NEPA as expressed by Justice Douglas, it would 
appear that courts ought to order reluctant agencies to issue status 
quo regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
Status quo regulations seem to be the best way to close the 
loophole in NEPA which developed when courts held that they 
lacked jurisdiction to enforce NEPA against non-federal parties 
who, while seeking federal funding, proceed to do irreparable dam-
age to the environment or foreclose less environmentally damaging 
alternatives. Parties seeking environmental protection will achieve 
more far-reaching results by bringing suit against federal agencies 
which do not have status quo regulations, rather than against the 
non-federal parties individually. Each time plaintiffs proceed 
against non-federal parties under NEPA, they must face the sub-
stantial burden of showing a sufficient nexus between the federal 
agency and the non-federal project sponsor. However, until such 
time as agencies either choose or are forced to issue such regulations, 
suits continue to be necessary against potential recipients of federal 
aid who are, together with their federal cohorts, frustrating the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act. 
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As environmentalists continue to press courts to enforce early 
compliance with the impact statement requirement of NEPA, 
clearer standards will emerge for determining when the relationship 
between the federal agency and the non-federal project sponsor has 
become close enough to give the courts jurisdiction over the non-
federal party. If enough litigation is commenced by concerned 
groups, perhaps project sponsors and federal agencies will begin to 
realize that it is far easier and more beneficial for everyone con-
cerned to prepare and evaluate impact statements as one of the first 
steps in developing a project which is to be considered for federal 
funds - which is, after all, no more than the original intent behind 
the National Environmental Policy Act. 
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